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The akratic pragmatist and her imaginary friend 
Akratic agents φ when they judge that they shouldn’t φ. Practical akrasia is performing an action 
despite judging it immoral or irrational. Epistemic akrasia is holding a belief despite judging it 
unjustified or irrational. Discussions of epistemic akrasia often treat justification and rationality as 
rising and falling together, as I will here.  
 
Many philosophers claim that epistemic akrasia must involve irrationality.1 They think one must 
be irrational in believing that one’s belief is unjustified, in holding the belief itself, or in 
combining these attitudes. Practical akrasia is widely held to be irrational, and one might expect 
epistemic akrasia to be similarly irrational.2 Moreover, epistemic akrasia involves conflicting 
beliefs. While having conflicting desires can constitute rationally permissible ambivalence, one 
might expect conflicting beliefs to be rationally forbidden. When one believes an inconsistent set 
of propositions, rationality requires drawing inferences that eliminate some of these beliefs. One 
might expect rational inference to similarly dispense with epistemic akrasia. 
 
To show that epistemic akrasia can be rational, this paper offers a case in which eliminating one 
belief by inference isn’t rationally required. It’s called Imaginary Friend: 
 
Nevia is a pragmatist about epistemic justification. She is convinced that beliefs are 
justified insofar as they promote the satisfaction of one’s desires. All the philosophers 
she knows are convinced of this view by a valid argument from premises one can 
rationally accept. Moreover, pragmatism just seems right to her. 
 
Nevia is also very lonely. She feels a little less lonely when she pretends that her 
imaginary friend Alexius exists. She strongly desires that her loneliness end, and she 
knows that believing in Alexius’ existence would end her loneliness. But since she has 
no evidence for Alexius’ existence, she is certain that he doesn’t really exist. Being a 
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pragmatist, she regards her belief in Alexius’ nonexistence as unjustified, and thinks of 
herself as irrational for being unable to rid herself of it.3 
 
Nevia’s pragmatism is the key feature that makes Imaginary Friend a case of rational akrasia. 
Pragmatism disconnects her beliefs about epistemic justification from truth. This leaves her no 
way to escape akrasia by revising her beliefs through valid inferences from her evidence. Such an 
escape route is available to evidentialists, who reject pragmatism in favor of the standard view 
that justification is closely connected to truth. (There is a narrower sense of “evidentialism” 
opposed to externalist epistemological views like reliabilism. This paper uses “evidentialism” only 
in contrast to “pragmatism.” Reliabilism is a form of evidentialism in this sense because it places 
importance on truth.) The connection to truth lets evidentialists go from believing a belief is 
unjustified to believing that it’s unlikely to be true, and thus revising it. Nevia’s pragmatism 
merely connects believing that a belief is unjustified to believing that it fails to satisfy one’s desires, 
which doesn’t lead to revising it. 
 
For Imaginary Friend to be a genuine case of rational epistemic akrasia, three things must obtain. 
First, Nevia’s belief that Alexius doesn’t exist must be rational. Second, her belief that 
pragmatism is the right theory of epistemic justification must be rational. Third, combining these 
beliefs must not introduce any irrationality. I’ll briefly explain why each of these propositions are 
true. While the first isn’t especially controversial, the other two are controversial enough to 
require an extended defense, which I’ll provide in the rest of this paper.  
 
Most epistemologists will agree that it’s rational for Nevia to believe that Alexius doesn’t exist. 
This is what her evidence suggests. On standard evidentialist views, epistemic justification is 
grounded in truth or something closely related to truth like evidence, accuracy, knowledge, 
reliability, or certainty. These evidentialist views treat Nevia as justified in believing that Alexius 
doesn’t exist. Her pragmatism doesn’t prevent evidentialism from applying to her – the 
fundamental standards of epistemic justification don’t depend on one’s beliefs about them. Since 
most of my readers will likely share my commitment to evidentialism, I won’t argue at length for 
evidentialism in this paper, or argue against pragmatism. 
 
Whether Nevia can rationally accept pragmatism is more controversial. The first half of this 
paper clarifies the nature of pragmatism about epistemic justification and argues that one can 
rationally accept it. Pragmatism is false, but not necessarily irrational. Epistemic justification is 
one of the many topics about which rational false belief is possible. I’ll present an argument for 
pragmatism that convinced a number of philosophers from different historical periods: the nature 
of justification is unified, and justification for some practical attitudes is a matter of desire-
satisfaction, so epistemic justification must be a matter of desire-satisfaction. Nevia’s belief in 
pragmatism is justified because she formed it on the basis of this argument, expert testimony 
favoring the argument, and her own intuition. While Mike Titelbaum (2015) argues that views 
including pragmatism must be irrational, the irrationality of akrasia is a premise of his argument, 
so demonstrating that akrasia can be rational will reveal his argument to be unsound. 
 
The second half argues that Nevia can rationally remain in her akratic state. She has no valid 
inferential route from believing that she should believe something to actually believing it. 
Accepting evidentialism would create such a valid inferential route, as it creates an inferential 
link from judging a belief justified to judging it true. Pragmatists break this link by rejecting the 
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connection between justification and truth. Ambivalent states where our conflicting attitudes 
don’t inferentially connect are rational, as there’s no rational inference the believer could draw to 
resolve the conflict. Akratic states aren’t constituted by attitudes that can inferentially connect 
with each other, and hence isn’t necessarily irrational. It is irrational for evidentialists because 
accepting evidentialism connects these attitudes, as I’ll explain in response to a case presented by 
Sophie Horowitz (2014).4 But for a pragmatist like Nevia, akrasia can be rational. 
 
Pragmatism about epistemic justification 
Truth, or something closely related, is widely agreed to play a central role in justifying belief. 
Nearly everyone agrees that believing the true has more intrinsic epistemic value than believing 
the false. Parties to this broad evidentialist consensus include many epistemologists who 
understand epistemic justification in terms of things other than truth itself, like evidence, 
reliability, coherence, knowledge, or certainty. All of these things have some important 
conceptual connection to truth. Evidence indicates what is true; the reliability of a process is 
determined by the proportion of beliefs it produces that are true; incoherent beliefs can’t all be 
true; knowledge entails truth; what’s certain is clearly true. I’m inclined to see the value of truth 
as the fundamental epistemic good, in which all epistemic value is grounded. 
 
“Epistemic” here means “related to belief” rather than “related to truth.” Epistemic justification, 
then, is the justification of belief, and epistemic value is the sort of value that makes beliefs good. I 
won’t use “epistemic” to indicate any direct connection to truth. This lets us describe pragmatism 
and evidentialism as contending views about epistemic justification. This usage makes 
evidentialism about epistemic value a synthetic truth rather than a conceptual truth.5 
 
Pragmatism is a less popular theory of epistemic justification than evidentialism, though it has 
some defenders.6 Pragmatists ground epistemic justification in things that they see as having 
practical value, such as pleasure or desire-satisfaction. These things lack such a close conceptual 
connection to truth. The pragmatist view I’ll consider here treats one’s beliefs as justified insofar 
as they promote the satisfaction of one’s desires. Pragmatists see true belief as having 
instrumental value in promoting desire-satisfaction, because it helps one navigate the world so as 
to better satisfy one’s desires. Furthermore, if one simply desires to believe the true, that gives 
true belief value independent of its future consequences. But in cases where false belief promotes 
desire-satisfaction more than true belief, pragmatism suggests believing the false. Imaginary Friend 
is such a case.  
 
Pragmatism about epistemic justification should be distinguished from pragmatism about truth. 
A pragmatist about truth understands truth to be whatever has some sort of practical value. A 
simple version of pragmatism about truth might follow William James (1897) in defining truth as 
whatever maximizes everyone’s desire-satisfaction. Pragmatists about epistemic justification need 
not accept pragmatism about truth. Their view is most distinctive if they reject pragmatism about 
truth while favoring a more orthodox view of truth like the correspondence theory. Then they 
will make the startling claim that it’s sometimes right to believe the false rather than the true, 
when believing the false contributes to desire-satisfaction.  
 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1886) seems to have combined pragmatism about epistemic justification and 
some fairly orthodox theory of truth in this way. It led him to make this startling claim: “The 
falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect our 
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new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life promoting, life-
preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating” (BGE 4). I’ll return to 
Nietzsche’s argument for this position later, but here it’s important to note that a pragmatist 
about epistemic justification who accepts the correspondence theory must say that we should 
sometimes believe the false. This is what Nevia thinks in Imaginary Friend. “Pragmatism” here will 
henceforth refer only to pragmatism about epistemic justification. 
 
How pragmatism can be rational 
Can one rationally accept pragmatism? As an evidentialist, I regard pragmatism as false. But I 
don’t think accepting pragmatism is necessarily irrational. False beliefs can be rational if they’re 
supported by sufficient evidence.  
 
For Imaginary Friend to be a case of rational epistemic akrasia, Nevia needs to have strong 
evidence for pragmatism. That’s why I stipulated three potential types of evidence for 
pragmatism in setting up the case – Nevia’s acceptance of a valid argument from reasonable 
premises, the testimony of other epistemologists, and the fact that pragmatism itself seems 
plausible to her. Epistemologists may differ on how much justification each type of evidence gives 
her. That’s why I presented three different types. Even if you don’t think one or two of them do 
much to justify Nevia’s belief in pragmatism, perhaps the third will strike you as sufficient. I’ll 
elaborate on each of them further.  
 
I’ll begin with the argument for pragmatism that Nevia and her epistemologist friends accept. 
Something close to the Humean Unity Argument below has been offered by both historical and 
contemporary pragmatists. It’s a simple argument, with two premises leading to a pragmatist 
conclusion: 
 
[Humeanism] For some practical attitudes, justification consists in promoting desire-satisfaction.  
[Unity] Justification consists in the same thing for all practical attitudes and beliefs. 
[Conclusion] For beliefs, justification consists in promoting desire-satisfaction.  
 
Humeanism has its share of defenders.7 So does Unity.8 Among contemporary philosophers, 
Susanna Rinard (2017) may come closest to defending both and deriving the pragmatist 
conclusion. She defends Unity, arguing that “the question ‘What should I believe?’ is to be 
answered in the same way as the question ‘What should I do?’” While it’s not clear whether her 
answer to ‘What should I do?’ is strictly Humean, she offers several cases in which desire-
satisfaction contributes to the justification of action. Rinard (2015) is happy to accept pragmatist 
conclusions about epistemic justification.  
 
Nietzsche also arrives at his pragmatism through a version of the Humean Unity Argument.9 His 
sympathy for both Humeanism and Unity arise in part from a commitment to error theory about 
objective value. He sees his epistemological and metaphysical naturalism as leaving no room for 
objective value, just as it left no room for God. But naturalists can more easily accept a sort of 
subjective value grounded in our desires. Desires and their objects both fit comfortably within 
naturalistic metaphysics, and he reduced value to a relation between them.10 Since we have some 
ways of knowing what we want, such value is accessible to naturalistic epistemology. These 
metaphysical and epistemological advantages led Nietzsche to embrace the positive normative 
claims of Humeanism. Since he saw his naturalistic commitments as permitting no other form of 
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value, he accepted Unity as well. This drove him to the pragmatist position quoted above, 
according to which the falsity of a judgment is not necessarily an objection to it.  
 
One can rationally accept pragmatism about epistemic justification on the basis of something like 
the Humean Unity argument, as Rinard and Nietzsche do. When I disagree with premises of 
their reasoning, I regard their beliefs in these premises as rational but false, and not as irrational. 
Whether Humeanism and Unity are true or false, one can rationally accept each of them. 
Furthermore, accepting both at the same time isn’t irrational in any obvious way. They aren’t 
inconsistent or Moore-paradoxical.11 If one accepts both, one is rationally permitted, if not 
required, to accept the pragmatism that they entail.12 
 
I don’t claim that the Humean Unity argument is sound. I accept Humeanism. But justification 
seems to come in too wide a variety of forms for Unity to be true.13 This is why I reject Unity and 
remain unconvinced by the argument. You might reject one or both of these premises. But as 
long as it seems to you that it wouldn’t necessarily be irrational to accept pragmatism on the basis 
of both premises, you agree with the point I’m using the argument to establish. 
 
Many other valid arguments for pragmatism might be constructed. If one denies that pragmatism 
can be rationally accepted, one has the burden of explaining why it’s irrational to accept the 
premises of any such argument and derive its conclusion. Even if you think there’s something 
irrational about accepting the Humean Unity argument, do you really want to commit yourself 
to the irrationality of accepting any valid argument sharing its pragmatist conclusion? 
 
Now I’ll turn to the second source of evidence Nevia has – the testimony of a large number of 
philosophers who join Nietzsche and Rinard in accepting the Humean Unity argument. Of 
course, this argument and its conclusion aren’t accepted by most philosophers we know. But this 
is merely a contingent matter. It’s possible to be in a community of philosophers who regard 
some argument for pragmatism like the Humean Unity argument as sound. One might then 
accept its conclusion in part because of their testimony.  
 
Much recent discussion concerns whether it’s fishy to form moral beliefs through testimony.14 
Whatever one may think about that issue, it’s hard to see any serious problem for forming beliefs 
about epistemic justification through testimony. If a reliable authority tells me “You should 
believe that p”, it seems perfectly fine to accept this and believe that I should believe that p. It 
may be easier to follow the evidentialist’s guidance than the pragmatist’s, if they’re open about 
their views of epistemic justification. The evidentialist thinks that I should believe that p because 
it is true; the pragmatist thinks I should believe that p because it’ll satisfy my desires. If I believe 
that p is true, I’ll believe that p; if I believe that believing that p will satisfy my desires, I still may 
not believe that p. So I’m disposed to more automatically follow the evidentialist’s advice than 
the pragmatist’s advice. But this difference doesn’t bear on whether I can be justified in believing 
their advice. I can justifiably believe normative testimony that I’m unable to follow. Practical 
akrasia often takes this form – perhaps I’m justified in believing my doctor’s testimony that I 
should exercise more, but I can’t bring myself to exercise. So I linger in a divided sort of 
ambivalent state, with my normative judgment favoring exercise despite the fact that I’m not 
doing it. I’ll explain why our psychological architecture allows this sort of ambivalence shortly. 
But what should be seen here is that there doesn’t seem to be any problem with forming beliefs 
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about the nature of epistemic justification on the basis of testimony. This gives Nevia another sort 
of evidence for pragmatism. 
 
A third potential source of justification for Nevia’s belief in pragmatism is that it seems right to 
her. Phenomenal conservatives like Michael Huemer (2001) regard the fact that something seems 
true as providing some justification for believing it. They would regard the fact that pragmatism 
seems true to Nevia as contributing to the justification of Nevia’s belief. Phenomenal 
conservativism provides an attractively unified conception of epistemic justification, and makes it 
easy for beliefs with normative content to be justified.  
 
Opponents of phenomenal conservatism might argue that it overgenerates justification for beliefs. 
Does one gain justification for believing any old thing, just because it seems true? As an 
unsympathetic evidentialist might ask, can Nevia be justified in a theory of epistemic justification 
as implausible as pragmatism just because it seems true? If such concerns convince you that 
Nevia doesn’t gain any justification for believing pragmatism simply because it seems true to her, 
I’m happy to grant the point and rely only on the other two sources of justification – her 
acceptance of the Humean Unity argument and philosophical testimony in its favor.  
 
This concludes my consideration of the sources of justification for Nevia’s belief in pragmatism. 
She accepts it on the basis of an argument from reasonable premises, philosophical testimony, 
and the fact that it seems right to her. Unless there’s some deep reason why belief in pragmatism 
has to be unjustified, Nevia will be justified in accepting it on some or all of these grounds.  
 
Titelbaum versus pragmatism 
 
Titelbaum defends a view entailing that pragmatism is irrational. This is the Fixed Point thesis: 
“Mistakes about the requirements of rationality are mistakes of rationality” (253). Those who 
regard epistemic rationality as having broadly evidentialist foundations regard pragmatism as 
mistaken. The Fixed Point Thesis requires them to also see pragmatism as irrational. 
 
Titelbaum derives the Fixed Point Thesis from a version of the enkratic principle: “No situation 
rationally permits any overall state containing both an attitude A and the belief that A is 
rationally forbidden in one’s current situation” (261). This means that Titelbaum derives the 
irrationality of pragmatism ultimately from the necessary irrationality of akrasia. And the 
necessary irrationality of akrasia is exactly what I’m concerned to deny. So if it can be shown that 
rational akrasia is possible – the goal of this paper – Titelbaum’s argument for the irrationality of 
pragmatism fails. One philosopher’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens, and that’s how 
things are with Titelbaum’s view and mine. I invoke the rationality of pragmatism in arguing that 
epistemic akrasia can be rational; Titelbaum invokes the irrationality of epistemic akrasia in 
arguing for the irrationality of views including pragmatism.  
 
To understand how the enkratic principle supports the Fixed Point Thesis, consider how a false 
belief about rationality becomes part of an irrational overall state under the enkratic principle. 
Suppose I believe that rationality forbids attitude A in my situation. But my belief is false – 
attitude A is in fact rationally required in my situation! Then I’m irrational whether or not I have 
attitude A. If I don’t have attitude A, I’m irrational because I lack an attitude that I’m rationally 
required to have. If I do have attitude A, I satisfy that requirement of rationality, but I violate the 
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enkratic principle by having attitude A while believing that it’s forbidden. This is how Titelbaum 
would characterize Nevia’s situation. She’s rationally required to form beliefs according to her 
evidence, but she thinks she’s forbidden to. Since she actually forms beliefs according to her 
evidence, she violates the enkratic principle.  
 
I hope the preceding arguments have convinced you that Titelbaum’s view entails something 
implausible: that pragmatism is necessarily irrational. Claire Field (2017) points out what an 
extreme commitment this is. In claiming that mistakes about rational requirements are 
necessarily irrational, Titelbaum assumes indefeasible justification for true beliefs about rational 
requirements. You might have thought that the Humean Unity argument, testimony, intuition, 
or at least all of them together would justify Nevia in accepting pragmatism. But according to 
Titelbaum, Nevia is still justified in accepting evidentialism, and none of her evidence for 
pragmatism can defeat this justification. Field points out that Titelbaum has no explanation of 
why principles of rationality have this extraordinary level of indefeasibility. Few if any other 
beliefs are indefeasible in this way, and systematic epistemological theories do little to explain it.  
 
Of course, you might think that my conclusion is implausible as well, if it seems intuitive to you 
that akrasia is necessarily irrational. While I’ve argued that the beliefs constituting Nevia’s akrasia 
can each be rationally held, that doesn’t entail that it’s rational to hold them together. If one part 
of my evidence supports p, and another part of my evidence supports ¬p, it would be irrational 
for me to infer p from the first part of my evidence, infer ¬p from the second part of my evidence, 
and hold both at the same time. Defenders of the enkratic principle may claim that akrasia 
constitutes a similarly irrational combination, even if one could rationally hold each belief 
constituting it.  
 
The rest of this paper examines akrasia itself, explaining how it can be rational – especially if 
evidentialism is true. Nevia’s belief that Alexius doesn’t exist and her belief that she is unjustified 
in believing this both are formed on the basis of her evidence. As I’ll argue, there is no good 
evidentialist story about why akrasia is irrational when both of the beliefs constituting it are 
supported by the agent’s evidence. Akrasia may be irrational when evidentialists undergo it, 
because they accept a connection between justification and truth that takes them from believing 
that one of their beliefs is unjustified to believing that it is untrue. But pragmatists like Nevia 
don’t accept this connection and don’t have the evidence it provides. Wholehearted evidentialists 
should therefore regard pragmatists as exempt from the enkratic principle. Akratic beliefs may 
seem weird, but one can rationally hold many a variety of weird beliefs on the basis of sufficiently 
weird evidence. Epistemic akrasia is just another instance of this familiar phenomenon. 
 
Why epistemic akrasia is stable and rational 
I’ll begin by considering how the causal profile of belief allows Nevia’s akratic state to remain 
stable. This causal profile nicely matches the epistemic norms evidentialists apply to belief, 
correlating belief’s psychological stability with evidentialists assessments of its rationality. No valid 
inferential routes grounded in evidentialism let Nevia escape akrasia.  
 
Functionalists generally treat these three properties of belief as essential to its nature:15 
 
1. Attending to an experience that p disposes one to believe that p.  
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2. Attending to logically related belief-contents disposes one to form the entailed beliefs or 
revise away inconsistencies. For example, if one believes p and pàq, attending to these 
contents disposes one to believe that q. If one believes p and ¬p, attending to these contents 
disposes one to revise away one of these beliefs.  
 
3. If one believes that doing A will raise the probability of E, attending to this proposition in 
the light of desire for E disposes one to A.  
 
These causal properties correspond to an evidentialist-friendly account of the norms governing 
belief. It’s natural for an evidentialist to hold that beliefs can be justified by experience (1) or 
other logically related beliefs (2). Experience and belief represent propositions as true, and 
evidentialists care about truth, so evidentialists can naturally treat them as justifying changes in 
belief. Bayesian approaches to epistemology treat (1) and (2) as the sorts of things that rationally 
change belief, while broadly Humean decision-theoretic views treat (3) as describing belief’s role 
in motivating rational action. As my focus is on epistemology, I’ll focus on (1) and especially (2).  
 
The stability of Nevia’s akratic state can be understood in terms of (2). Beliefs cause each other to 
go in and out of existence because of logical relations between their contents. The beliefs 
constitutive of Nevia’s akratic state don’t have the right logical relations to interact inferentially. 
Nevia believes that she should believe that Alexius exists. She also believes that Alexius doesn’t 
exist. These beliefs are consistent with each other, and there are no further beliefs she holds that 
make up an inconsistent set.  
 
Because of Nevia’s pragmatism, her belief that she would be justified in believing that Alexius 
exists can’t cause her to believe that he exists. If there was some way to go from “I would be 
justified in believing that Alexius exists” to “Alexius exists”, she might be able to do so. 
Evidentialists can make a psychological transition from believing that p is justified to believing 
that p is true. This belief connects “I would be justified in believing that p” to “It’s probably true 
that p.” From there, evidentialists can go to having some high credence that p which might be 
sufficient for belief. But the path from justification to truth to belief that we would follow is closed 
to Nevia. Her pragmatism connects justification to desire-satisfaction rather than truth. “My 
desires would be better satisfied if I believed that p” doesn’t lead one to the belief that it’s 
probably true that p, or to a high credence in p. Someone might make this transition through 
wishful thinking. Strange that escaping akrasia might require an irrational process rather than a 
rational one!  
 
You might think of another way for Nevia to escape akrasia: by following the enkratic principle, 
according to which one should φ if one believes that one should φ. The enkratic principle is often 
applied to practical rationality, where φing is intending or doing something. But it also can be 
applied to epistemic rationality, where φing is believing a proposition. If humans had a 
psychological process that would automatically implement the enkratic principle, Nevia’s belief 
that she should believe that Alexius exists would cause her to believe that Alexius exists.  
 
Practical akrasia is evidence that human motivational psychology includes no such process. 
Believing that one should φ can’t cause φing by itself, and always requires help from another 
psychological state. Believing that one should φ, or that one has a reason to φ, doesn’t cause the 
action unless one desires to do what one should or what one has reason to do. As I argue in 
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Humean Nature (2017), “the concept of a reason is no more psychologically significant than the 
concept of a raisin. If you desire raisins, your beliefs about how to act for raisins will play the 
motivational role of means–end beliefs. The same is true for beliefs about how to act for 
reasons… All beliefs, including beliefs about reasons, get their motivational and deliberative 
significance from contingent relations to what is desired” (164). 
 
Believing a proposition, like performing an action, isn’t something we can do just because we 
believe we should do it. This was recognized even by Blaise Pascal (1670), who famously argues 
that belief in God is justified for the pragmatic reason that it improves the expected value of one’s 
afterlife. Pascal accepts that recognizing this pragmatic reason won’t be sufficient to cause belief 
in God. After laying out his pragmatic argument for believing in God, he considers an 
interlocutor who says, “I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What, then, 
would you have me do?” As Pascal recognizes, the interlocutor can’t just infer that God exists 
from the belief that one should believe that God exists. So Pascal suggests immersion in religious 
society: “These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an 
ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they 
believed, taking the holy water, having masses said…”  
 
A parallel course of action might be available to Nevia. She might join a supportive Facebook 
group for people with imaginary friends, and let this social environment irrationally influence her. 
Here again we confront the irony that pragmatists might require arational or irrational means to 
escape akrasia. The human mind doesn’t seem to include any general inferential process by 
which believing that one should φ makes one φ. This is why functionalist characterizations of 
belief include no such process, and why pragmatists require more roundabout methods.  
 
Even if evidentialists are open to accepting norms on belief that aren’t grounded in its causal 
properties, the enkratic principle shouldn’t be among them. Revising a belief to make it 
consistent with the contents of experience or other beliefs is in the spirit of evidentialism, because 
experience and belief represent their contents as true. While experience and belief can be false, 
they’re at least representations of things as true that the agent has accepted. But revising a belief 
in accordance with one’s judgments of what one should believe has no necessary connection to 
the truth. Of course, if one accepts an evidentialist norm, revising beliefs in accordance with the 
enkratic principle would have an important connection to truth. But like Nevia, one might accept 
other norms that have nothing to do with truth. If one accepts a pragmatist norm, or a norm of 
believing the false, or a norm of having the number four in belief-contents whenever possible, the 
enkratic principle will drive belief-revisions that have no important connection to truth. This is 
why the enkratic principle can’t be grounded in evidentialism, and thoroughgoing evidentialists 
should regard it with suspicion. 
 
For pragmatists, akrasia is an instance of disconnected ambivalence 
 
Nevia, Pascal, and others who believe that they should believe that p for pragmatic reasons can 
find themselves in an irresolvably ambivalent epistemic state regarding p. They may be certain 
that ¬p, while being equally certain that they should believe that p. The causal properties of 
belief don’t allow high levels of confidence in these two propositions to directly moderate each 
other. “Alexius doesn’t exist” and “I should believe that Alexius exists” are consistent with each 
other, so epistemic pressures against inconsistent belief don’t lead us to revise them. Creating 
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inconsistency requires a further belief, like the evidentialist’s belief that one shouldn’t believe false 
propositions. This belief takes evidentialists from “Alexius does not exist” to “I should not believe 
that Alexius exists”, which is inconsistent with “I should believe that Alexius exists.” This is why 
rational evidentialists won’t continue being certain in both “Alexius doesn’t exist” and “I should 
believe that Alexius exists” and will retreat from certainty regarding at least one of these 
propositions. Meanwhile, rational pragmatists need not retreat from certainty on any particular 
proposition. They can remain in their ambivalent and akratic state.  
 
Rational evidentialists and rational pragmatists who start out in epistemic akrasia will thus end 
up in different forms of epistemic ambivalence. As we’ve seen, evidentialism itself is a premise of 
reasoning by which its adherents can revise away one of the beliefs constituting their akrasia. The 
psychological states constituting evidentialists’ ambivalence are connected by inferential relations 
that allow them to interact inferentially with each other. This makes evidentialists’ akrasia an 
example of connected ambivalence, where rational inferences allow revising away one of the mental 
states constituting one’s ambivalence. Connected ambivalence is more easily mitigated or 
resolved, because the attitudes constituting ambivalence can interact inferentially with each other 
to bring one’s mind into harmony.  
 
Pragmatists, meanwhile, don’t have the connection between their epistemic value judgments and 
their first-order beliefs that evidentialists do. This makes pragmatists’ akrasia an example of 
disconnected ambivalence. The attitudes constituting their ambivalence aren’t connected to each 
other by inferential relations. This is why they can’t rationally revise their way out of akrasia. “I 
should believe that p” and “¬p” aren’t themselves connected by any inferential relations proper 
to belief. Without the connection provided by something like a belief in evidentialism, both will 
remain.  
 
Connected and disconnected ambivalence appear among practical attitudes as well as epistemic 
attitudes. Philosophical disagreement about moral psychology includes disagreements about 
whether particular forms of ambivalence are connected or disconnected. Some anti-Humean 
psychological theories include an inferential process by which belief that one should not desire 
some end E eliminates one’s desire for E. Such anti-Humean theories treat ambivalence 
constituted by such a belief and desire as connected. Humeans reject these inferential processes, 
and regard such ambivalence as disconnected. A consideration favoring the Humean view is that 
it explains why one can’t change one’s sexual orientation to match one’s beliefs about what sort 
of sexual activity one should desire. The failure of conversion therapy demonstrates that this isn’t 
something human beings can actually do.  
 
The varieties of connected and disconnected ambivalence go beyond akrasia. Having 
contradictory beliefs can be seen as a type of connected ambivalence regarding a proposition. 
Believing that p and believing that ¬p is a way of being epistemically ambivalent towards p. It’s 
also irrational. Fortunately, it can be resolved by bringing together the total evidence regarding p 
and abandoning at least one of the beliefs on the basis of this evidence. Conflicting desires about 
an option often constitute disconnected ambivalence. You might be ambivalent about going to 
graduate school because you desire to do philosophy, while also desiring more job security than 
academia offers. There’s no inferential process by which your desire to do philosophy will reduce 
your desire for job security, or vice versa. This is what makes such ambivalence disconnected.  
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Whether instances of ambivalence are connected or disconnected will depend both on the 
general psychological laws governing human mental states and on the specific mental states that 
the person in question has. The debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans about motivation 
concerns general laws. The differences between how evidentialists and pragmatists can rationally 
find their way out of epistemic akrasia concerns specific differences in what they believe.  
 
It’s easy to see how connected ambivalence can be irrational. It can be mitigated or resolved by a 
further rational inference. If rationality requires drawing this inference, it’s irrational not to draw 
it. Believers in contradictory propositions can abandon one belief or the other by inference from 
their total evidence. If the anti-Humeans were right, we’d be able to change our desires by 
inference from our beliefs about what we should desire. Evidentialists can revise away one of the 
beliefs constitutive of epistemic akrasia – either the normative judgment or the first-order belief – 
by means of an inference that involves their belief in evidentialism itself. 
 
It’s harder to see how disconnected ambivalence could be irrational. There’s no further rational 
inference that an agent can make to escape it. If you’re ambivalent about graduate school 
because it’ll satisfy your desire to think about philosophy but frustrate your desire for job security, 
there’s no inference you can draw to make one of these desires go away. On Humean views, 
inferences from normative beliefs alone can’t change our desires either. And akratic pragmatists 
who disconnect justification from truth are left with no inferential relation between the normative 
judgments and first-order beliefs constituting their akrasia.  
 
The problem with calling disconnected ambivalence irrational is that there’s no way to resolve it 
by rational inference. I take it that rational inferences involve types of mental state transitions 
that humans at their best are able to make. We can be irrational if some sort of impairment 
leaves us not at our best, and we fail to make an inference that we could have made. But it’s hard 
to see how we could be irrational for failing to draw inferences of types that our minds are simply 
unable to perform. And since disconnected ambivalence is a condition that no rational inference 
can cure, it’s hard to see how it could be an irrational condition.  
 
As mentioned before, evidentialists who are willing to accept norms of rationality that human 
psychology can’t implement should still reject the enkratic principle. Imaginary Friend illustrates 
this. Rational norms grounded in evidentialism won’t create any connection between Nevia’s 
belief that she should believe that Alexius exists and her belief that Alexius doesn’t exist.  
 
Why evidentialists shouldn’t apply the enkratic principle to pragmatists 
 
Now we’re in position to directly address the enkratic principle. In its most general form, this is 
simply the requirement not to be akratic. Applied specifically to epistemology, it rules out 
believing things when one believes one shouldn’t believe them. It entails that Nevia is irrational 
for believing that Alexius doesn’t exist while believing that she shouldn’t believe this. As I’ll argue, 
the enkratic principle is not a genuine requirement of rationality. It appears to be one only if we 
assume that akratic agents accept something like evidentialism.16 
 
The enkratic principle fails as a requirement of rationality because akrasia can be an instance of 
disconnected ambivalence. “I should believe that Alexius exists” and “Alexius doesn’t exist” are 
consistent with each other. They form an inconsistent set only with the addition of further 
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propositions like the evidentialist claim that one should believe the truth. Without adding a belief 
in evidentialism or some other belief that connects them, there is no way to eliminate one by a 
valid chain of reasoning from the other. 
 
Why does the enkratic principle seem like a requirement of epistemic rationality? How could it 
be irrational to have these two beliefs that are perfectly consistent with each other? Part of the 
explanation may be that we tend to assume that believers accept evidentialism. Such assumptions 
are implicit in the formulations of many cases of epistemic akrasia in the literature. Accepting 
evidentialism makes epistemic akrasia into an instance of connected ambivalence, which can be 
resolved through inferences that accord with evidentialist norms and that humans can actually 
make.  
 
For an example of how accepting evidentialism allows for rational resolutions to akrasia, let’s 
consider one of the most prominent purported cases of rational epistemic akrasia: Sophie 
Horowitz’ dartboard case.17 Suppose Eve throws a dart at a 5x5 grid. Though the intersections of 
the grid aren’t well-marked, they are magnetized within the dartboard, so the metal tip of the 
dart will land precisely at some intersection. Eve looks at her dart, which has landed somewhere 
in the middle of the dartboard. From a distance, she can’t see clearly whether it hit <3,3> or one 
of what I’ll call the four “adjacent intersections”: <2,3>, <3,2>, <3,4>, or <4,3>. She divides 
her credence evenly among each of these five intersections, assigning them a credence of 0.2 each. 
This produces an 0.8 credence that the dart hit one of the four adjacent intersections. But as 
Horowitz notes, this distribution is rational only if the dart hit <3,3>. Otherwise, why would she 
assign positive credences only to <3,3> and the four adjacent intersections, while assigning zero 
credence to all other intersections? So she has 0.8 credence that it hit an adjacent intersection, 
and 0.2 credence that she should have 0.8 credence that it hit an adjacent intersection. While it’s 
hard to identify the threshold at which high credence becomes belief, this can plausibly be seen as 
a case of believing that it hit an adjacent intersection, and believing that she shouldn’t believe 
that it hit an adjacent intersection. So as Horowitz says, this is a case of epistemic akrasia.  
 
Horowitz also claims that Eve’s assignment of credences is rational. Here I disagree. Eve has 
applied some evidence to her higher-order credences that she hasn’t applied to her lower-order 
credences. She recognizes that her distribution of credences to the adjacent intersections is 
rational only if the dart is most likely to have hit <3,3>. That produced her 0.2 credence that she 
should have an 0.8 credence that the dart hit an adjacent intersection. As Horowitz recognizes in 
calling this a case of epistemic akrasia, that 0.2 higher-order credence casts doubt on her 0.8 
credence. So the next step for Eve is to reconsider her 0.8 credence. When she does, she’ll notice 
that her lower-order distribution of credences to intersections doesn’t make much sense. <3,3> 
must be more likely than each of the adjacent intersections. Otherwise, why is it the only 
intersection all of whose adjacent intersections she assigns positive credences to? This is the same 
insight that shaped her higher-order credences, and it deserves application to her lower-order 
credences as well. She might then revise her credence that the dart hit <3,3> up to 0.6, and 
revise down to 0.1 in each adjacent intersection. That would leave her with an 0.4 credence that 
the dart hit some adjacent intersection, and (again copying her credence in <3,3>) an 0.6 
credence that her credence in its hitting an adjacent intersection should be 0.4. And with that, 
she has rationally revised her beliefs so as to avoid epistemic akrasia.  
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Nevia wouldn’t be able to do as Eve did. Nevia’s credences regarding what she should believe 
depend on what would satisfy her desires. If it’s stipulated that she has to bet lots of money on 
where the dart landed, she might mimic Eve’s pattern of reasoning. Pragmatists mimic 
evidentialists when they’re gambling, because believing the truth promotes gamblers’ desire-
satisfaction. But if for some reason she thinks that believing the dart landed on <5,5> would best 
satisfy her desires, she’ll form a high credence that she should believe the dart landed on <5,5>. 
Maybe she imagines that Alexius believes the dart landed on <5,5>, and she desires to share the 
credences that she imagines he has. Then she’ll find herself in another case of rational epistemic 
akrasia. She won’t believe that the dart landed on <5,5>, much like the interlocutor who 
couldn’t get himself to believe in God on the basis of Pascal’s Wager. She’ll just fail to believe 
what she thinks she should believe. 
 
Horowitz implicitly stipulates that her protagonist (whom I’m calling Eve) is an evidentialist. Why 
else would Eve form higher-order credences about some topic that have any grounding in her 
lower-order credences about that topic? Pragmatists need not do this. They form higher-order 
credences about topics on the basis of lower-order credences about desire-satisfaction.  
 
Many views about epistemic justification that are worse than pragmatism similarly block the 
inferences that would resolve akrasia. Suppose Quadry accepts a fourist epistemic norm: his 
belief-contents should have as many fours in them as possible. Then he might believe with a 
credence near certainty that he should believe that the dart landed on <4,4>, while having 
credences like Eve’s about where the dart actually hit. Quadry has no path out of epistemic 
akrasia, as he can’t connect his higher-order credences and his lower-order credences.  
 
If pragmatism can be rational, the enkratic principle can give bad advice. It tells pragmatists that 
they’re rationally required to give up either pragmatism or the first-order beliefs that don’t 
conform to it. Assuming that their pragmatism is rationally held, the only remaining option is to 
abandon first-order beliefs that were formed by properly considering the evidence.  
 
This is why the enkratic principle rises and falls with the dubious view that evidentialism is the 
only rational theory of epistemic justification. Evidentialists can escape epistemic akrasia through 
a form of enkratic reasoning that uses evidentialism itself as a premise. But if pragmatism can be 
rationally held, its adherents can find themselves in a state of disconnected ambivalence between 
it and their first-order beliefs. Any evidentialist spectators will then watch with horror as the 
enkratic principle tells pragmatists to give up their true beliefs. To an evidentialist like myself, 
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particularly strong anti-evidentialist conclusion. 
2 I agree with Arpaly (2003) that practical akrasia can be rational. 
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4 Perceptive epistemologists have noted tensions between evidentialism and the enkratic 
requirement. See Lasonsen-Aarnio (forthcoming), Littlejohn (2015), and Worsnip (2015). 
5 I’m inclined towards Railton’s (1986, 1989) naturalistic realism, which identifies evaluative 
properties with natural properties via synthetic a posteriori identities. On this view, truth would be 
identical to epistemic value.  
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10 Sinhababu (2015). 
11 Chislenko (2016). 
12 We can also stipulate that Nevia knows that accepting each premise and the conclusion 
promotes her desire-satisfaction. Then accepting the argument is pragmatically justified.  
13 I agree with Qu (2014) that David Hume (1739) would also have rejected the argument for this 
reason – he famously distinguishes the truth-based norms governing belief from whatever norms 
might govern desire. Ridge (2003) and Schafer (2014) interpret Hume as more friendly to Unity. 
14 Hills (2009), Fletcher (2016).  
15 Schwitzgebel (2019) 
16 Most discussions of epistemic akrasia in the literature concern higher-order evidence that 
suggests the truth of a different proposition than lower-order evidence, like Alexander (2013) and 
Daoust (2018). In Imaginary Friend, akrasia is instead generated by the agent’s acceptance of an 
unusual normative theory. This generates disconnected rather than connected ambivalence. 
17 Williamson (2000), Feldman (2005), and Christensen (2018) suggest broadly similar cases.  
